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Introduction. The current study is aimed at understanding the mecha-
nisms governing online rating systems such as Yelp, IMDB etc. The so-
called referral systems have become so popular over the years one can only
wonder how they work and if they do at all.
Online ratings are based on users’ impressions and opinions they form after
using a certain product or service. Hence, the first unknown in the equation
is the mechanism under which a user decides to purchase a certain good
or use some service. We identify two factors that come into play in such a
choice; a subjective factor and an objective factor. The subjective factor is
the impression the user forms on the product or business; the gut feeling
that tells him whether it is worth his time and money. The gut feeling
is not always reliable; how many times have you had a good impression
of a restaurant only to find out that it is not entirely to your taste? The
reliability of the customer’s gut feeling turns out to be an important factor in
the model. The objective factor relates to the quality of the business assessed
independently of users’ tastes or preferences. Often times, the online rating
of a business is taken as a proxy for its objective ?quality rating?. The
underlying assumption is that by averaging ratings across users of varying
tastes and preferences, dependencies upon said factors are eliminated.
It is essential to note the importance of subjectivity in a user’s choice. We
stress the fact that a business or product is not simply good or bad; rather,
it is good or bad from a certain user’s perspective. Businesses that are per-
ceived as good by a majority of users are labeled as “high quality” businesses
and businesses that are perceived as good by a minority of users are labeled
as “low quality” businesses. A natural question to ask is whether inherently
high-quality businesses can ever be labeled as low quality through online
rating systems.
Next we examine the mechanism under which online ratings are formed.
A user chooses to try a certain business or not by a rational evaluation of
the subjective and objective factors under a user-agnostic utility function.
Upon trying a business the user leaves a rating that is a reflection of his own
subjective perception of its quality. Given that we take the online rating
to be the objective factor in the decision making process, a user’s action is
affected by the actions of all the users who have tried the business in the
past, hence the notion of a sequential move game.
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Under this model, it is clear that the ?objective? online rating is sequen-
tially updated through users’ subjective ratings. Thus at its early stages,
a business is at the mercy of the subjectivity of its customers. In theory,
some businesses could die simply because they were first approached by the
wrong customers; others could be overrated by similar mechanisms. In the
long run however, one would expect the online rating to converge to an ob-
jective measure of a business?s quality. We seek to determine how often and
under what conditions this is the case.
Notation. We write
X ∼ Bern(p) or X ∼ Unif[0,1]
to express that a random variable X is distributed according to a Bernoulli
distribution with parameter p ∈ [0, 1] or according to a uniform distribution
over the interval [0, 1], respectively. Furthermore if P is a property we write
1 {P} =
{
1 if P holds,
0 otherwise.
With this notation in mind, we are now equipped to introduce more formally
the general format of what we call a rating game.
Rating Game. Suppose consumers i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3, . . . } must make some
decision sequentially according their order. The decision might be whether
to adopt a product or service of a firm whose overall quality is given by
α ∈ [0, 1]. In our consideration we take the firm to be a restaurant, and the
restaurant quality α is taken to represent the portion of the total population
who will enjoy their experience at the restaurant (i.e. the objective factor).
Each consumer i will independently either like or dislike the restaurant ac-
cording to vi ∼ Bern(α), but i will only learn of this value if she goes to the
restaurant. Instead, consumer i knows the value of a private signal xi (the
subjective factor), which is equal to vi with probability ρ. That is,
xi ∼ Bern(ρvi + (1− ρ)(1− vi)),
so if vi = 1 then xi ∼ Bern(ρ) is accurate to vi with probability ρ; and if
vi = 0 then xi ∼ Bern(1 − ρ) is also accurate to vi with probability ρ. In
a sense, then, ρ represents how well consumers know what they like. The
value of ρ is common knowledge, so we may assume that the private signals
are on average accurate at least half the time ρ ≥ 0.5 (indeed if ρ < 0.5 then
each consumer takes her new private signal to be 1 − xi, which is accurate
to vi on average 1− ρ > 0.5 of the time).
Each consumer i ∈ N must decide in order whether to attend the restaurant,
and she knows (1) her own private signal xi and (2) the average value of the
vj ’s for consumers j < i who have attended the restaurant already. If Ni is
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the set of all j < i who attended the restaurant, we denote this average
v¯i :=
1
|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
vj ,
and when Ni is empty we take v¯i =
1
2 (this initialization is an important
assumption, and we consider later generalizations of the rating game where
the restaurant can choose the initialization). We call the value v¯i the rating.
As a summary of this game, we have
• Players – consumers i ∈ N.
• Moves – each i ∈ N decides, in order, whether to attend a restaurant.
• Information – each i ∈ N knows her private signal xi and the current
rating v¯i.
• Payoffs – if i does not attend the restaurant, her payoff is 0; other-
wise, her payoff is 2(vi − 12), i.e. if she does like it, her payoff is 1
and if she doesn’t, her payoff is −1.
Solution. Individuals do not observe their type. Hence, in order to decide
whether to go to the restaurant or not, each individual will proceed by
maximizing over types his ex-ante expected payoff given some signal xi.
Recall that each individual has a type vi ∈ {0, 1}, observes a private signal
xi ∈ {0, 1} and choose an action ai ∈ {0, 1}, where ai = 1 indicates that
he goes to the restaurant and ai = 0 indicates that he does not. The ex-
ante expected payoff from choosing action ai for individual i is denoted as
E
[
u(ai, vi)|xi
]
, where u(ai, vi) is the utility individual i gets by choosing
action ai when his type is vi. The optimal choice of action for individual i,
denoted a∗i , is given by:
a∗i = argmax
ai
E
[
u(ai, vi)|xi
]
= argmax
ai
∑
q∈{0,1}
u(ai, q)p(vi = q|xi)
= argmax
ai
1
p(xi)
∑
q∈{0,1}
u(ai, q)p(vi = q, xi)
= argmax
ai
∑
q∈{0,1}
u(ai, q)p(vi = q)p(xi|vi = q)
=
 1
{∑
q∈{0,1} u(1, q)p(vi = q)p(xi = 1|vi = q) >
∑
q∈{0,1} u(0, q)p(vi = q)p(xi = 1|vi = q)
}
if xi = 1
1
{∑
q∈{0,1} u(1, q)p(vi = q)p(xi = 0|vi = q) >
∑
q∈{0,1} u(0, q)p(vi = q)p(xi = 0|vi = q)
}
otherwise.
=
{
1 {−(1− α)(1− ρ) + αρ > 0× (1− α)(1− ρ) + 0× αρ} if xi = 1
1 {−(1− α)ρ+ α(1− ρ) > 0× (1− α)ρ+ 0× α(1− ρ)} if xi = 0
=
{
1 {−1 + α+ ρ− αρ+ αρ > 0} if xi = 1
1 {−ρ+ αρ+ α− αρ > 0} if xi = 0
=
{
1 {α > 1− ρ} if xi = 1
1 {α > ρ} if xi = 0
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More generally, the derivation of the optimal action choice doesn’t require
an explicit functional form for the utility function u(ai, vi). The only as-
sumption made is that u(ai, 0) + u(ai, 1) = 0. In other words, the payoff
from going to a low quality restaurant is compensated by the payoff from
going to a high quality restaurant. Similarly, the payoff from not going to
a low quality restaurant is compensated by the payoff from not going to a
high quality restaurant.
On the other hand, the optimal actions do make a lot of sense. First, indi-
viduals require more compelling evidence to go to a restaurant when they
receive a negative private signal (a∗i = 1 when xi = 0 if α > ρ) as opposed
to a positive private signal (a∗i = 1 when xi = 1 if α > 1− ρ). Moreover, we
note that the “objective quality parameter” α plays the role of an adjust-
ment. Naturally, the private signal xi is noisy and doesn’t always coincide
with vi. As a result, the individual doesn’t simply follow the private signal
xi but factors in the information carried by α. Precisely, if individual i is
more likely to enjoy the restaurant than his signal is to be right (α > ρ),
the optimal action specifies that he should go to the restaurant regardless
of his private signal a∗i = 1 (∀ xi ∈ {0, 1}). Intuitively, if (α > ρ > 0.5) and
xi = 1, then everything indicates that he will enjoy the venue and the ratio-
nal choice can only be to dine there. If on the other hand (α > ρ) and xi = 0,
then he must choose whether to follow his private signal or the objective rat-
ing. Given that the private signal is more likely to be wrong than he is to
not enjoy the venue, the rational choice is to dine at the venue. By analogy,
if the individual is less likely to enjoy the restaurant than his signal is to
be wrong then even with a positive private signal (xi = 0), the individual
chooses to avoid the venue (a∗i = 0). By contrast, when the objective quality
parameter doesn’t fall in any of these two edge cases (ρ > α > 1− ρ), the
individual simply follows his private signal:
a∗i =
{
1 {α > 1− ρ} = 1 if xi = 1
1 {α > ρ} = 0 if xi = 0 ⇐⇒ a
∗
i = xi
Thus, the noisy signal xi is trusted unless there is compelling evidence from
α that sways the balance of probabilities in one direction or the other.
Finally, we note that individuals do not observe the objective quality pa-
rameter α and are forced to estimate it somehow. The essence of our work
lies in the fact that individuals are assumed to use the average online rating
v¯i as an estimator of α. The fact that v¯i is not necessarily a consistent esti-
mator of α is not an issue; it is precisely what makes the results interesting.
Comparison. We consider the similarities and differences with the rating
game and other games in which individuals must combine noisy private
information with inferred information from other players. A motivating
scenario from probability is usually described as follows:
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A prison warden has been given explicit directions to reveal to three prison-
ers on death row—Alice, Bob, and Charlie—precisely the information that
one of them (chosen at random) had been pardoned and that the remaining
two of them will be executed in the coming week. None of the prisoners can
communicate to each other, but they each speak with the warden regularly.
Prisoner A asks the warden to reveal who will be executed. The warden,
careful not to reveal to A any information on her own fate, reveals that B
will be executed.
The point is that A may mistakenly reason that, now since one of A or C
must be executed, her chances of being executed have risen from 13 to
1
2 . The
warden was clever to realize, however, that the probability of A’s execution
is independent of the news of B’s execution, so the probability remains at
1
3 , which one shows using Bayes’ rule. A similar tradeoff between having
tangible information and being able to make use of it is realized gradually
in the rating game. At first, player 1 has no information of other players’
preferences and must make her decision based solely on her private signal x1
and the initial rating v¯1 =
1
2 ; suppose player 1 does visit the restaurant, in
which case player 2 knows x2 and v¯2 = v1. So player 2 knows exactly whether
or not player 1 liked the restaurant, but this tells him very little more about
his own preferences. Since vi varies from person to person, player 2 wants
a more aggregate indication of how well consumers liked the restaurant. As
i ∈ N increases and more players have contributed to the rating, those who
have decided to try the restaurant may have become a self-selective pool,
relying both on their private signal and the current rating. So while v¯i for
small i depends greatly on the inclinations of a few consumers, v¯i as i gets
larger may become a substantially biased estimator of α; as we shall see, it
depends in significant ways on how well individuals know their own tastes.
For example, in the case where ρ = 1, all the consumers know precisely
whether they like the restaurant because xi = vi. So consumers do not need
to know the rating in order to decide: they just follow their private signals.
It is interesting to note, however, that in this special case we have the rating
converges v¯i → 1 = ρ as i→∞ for any α > 0.
An important related model depicts an information cascade. In one example,
an employer might find a job applicant very promising, but knowing that
the applicant has been rejected for similar jobs in the past may cause the
employer to ignore his own impression and reject the applicant anyway; in
another example, a stock value can become overinflated when individuals
ignore their personal evaluations of its quality because they see the stock
value spike. In this model the users all get the same value vi = v ∈ {0, 1}
from the restaurant, so we might think of a rating game with α ∈ {0, 1}
chosen according to a Bern(12). That way vi = α for every consumer i ∈ N
but they simply don’t know whether the restaurant is good or bad. Instead of
getting a rating from previous consumers, in an information cascade model,
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consumer i knows whether each previous j < i decided to try the restaurant.
Each consumer i also has their private signal xi which still depends on ρ
in the same way. Supposing that indeed vi = α = 1 (individuals will like
the restaurant if they go) we showed (in an assignment) that in this model,
by the time individual 3 makes her decision, already with probability ρ2 is
everyone willing to ignore their private signal and go to the restaurant (a
‘correct cascade’) and with probability (1− ρ)2 is everyone willing to ignore
their private signal and avoid the restaurant (an ‘incorrect cascade’). We
made two essential alterations when coming up with the rating game: vi
depends on the individual i in our model, and each individual cannot see
the decisions of the previous, only the rating they leave. Both changes are
made partially with the hope that it becomes more feasible to prevent either
cascade and partially as a nice context to study the rating system.
Experiments and Results. Fixing the strategy described in the ‘solution’
section, it begins to make sense to ask about simulating this game, since some
quantities like the rating v¯i converge as i gets very large. One quantity we
might study using simulated data is the average rating, to see if it converges
to what we expect. Fixing ρ = 0.8, we plot the average rating v¯i versus i
for various α.
Figure 1. Rating v¯i versus consumers i for various α.
When α > ρ we have v¯i → α as we expected. We interpret this to mean
that whenever enough people will like the restaurant, it does not matter how
good people are at knowing their own preferences because a critical mass
of people who try the restaurant and leave good reviews will keep people
coming and trying the food. In other words, the ratings are so compelling
that every individual chooses to go to the restaurant. As a result, the portion
of the population who goes reflects the overall population well. Hence the
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proportion of people who go and like it converges to the true proportion
of people who like it. When α ∈ [0.5, ρ] we appear to have v¯i → ρ. We
interpret this to mean that when the quality is ‘so-so’ (more accurately,
when it is liked by a fair amount of the population), the average rating
tends to be higher than the quality α itself. This suggests that a moderate
quality restaurant can attain a degree of self-selectivity in its consumer base.
Individuals are wary of the so-so rating and decide to trust their private
signal. As a result, only individuals with a positive private signal decide
to go to the restaurant. Among them, a larger fraction likes the restaurant
than in the overall population, hence v¯i > α. When α ∈ [1 − ρ, 0.5) it is
harder to tell what happens: v¯i converges to some value between α and ρ,
increasing with respect to α. It can be shown using Bayes’ rule that when
v¯i converges, it approaches
min
(
αρ
αρ+ (1− α)(1− ρ) , ρ
)
In other words, customer selection through private signals weighs the rating
upwards for medium quality restaurants. The rating however is not bound
to increase forever. If the rating becomes too large, everyone wants to go to
the restaurant regardless of their private signal. It is the end of self-selection
and everyone starts rating the business. The ratings become more and more
reflective of the true business quality and start decreasing. Soon enough,
the ratings become so-so again and only individuals with positive signals
go to the venue. Intuitively, the process should lead the rating to converge
hence the above mathematical expression.
Finally, we observe that some of the runs displayed in Figure 1 show a
flat rating at around 0.2. These correspond to runs where unlucky busi-
nesses were visited in early stages by negative customers. Their ratings
subsequently took a hit, and the evidence showing that they are low-quality
restaurants became overwhelming for anyone to knock on their door ever
again.
More formally, it has been noted in the ‘solution’ section that if the rating
falls below 1 − ρ, consumers will stop going to the restaurant regardless of
their private signal. We refer to this as “business death.” So in a given
simulation a business can die fairly quickly. Consider the following recursive
formula for the rating:
v¯i+1 =
{
v¯i if i+ 1 doesn’t go
|Ni+1|v¯i+vi+1
|Ni+1|+1 if i+ 1 goes
where |Ni+1| is the number of consumers who went to the restaurant before
i + 1. If enough consumers who dislike the restaurant go, it may end up
the case that v¯i falls below 1 − ρ, in which case the business dies, because
no consumer wants to go to a restaurant with v¯i < 1− ρ. We estimate the
business death after 1000 consumers by averaging over 1000 simulated trials
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for over 5000 (ρ, α) pairs. We reason that since v¯i can only change very little
at a time after i > 1000 that our estimate is a very good approximation for
the total probability of business death.
Figure 2. Probability of business death versus (α, ρ).
This figure has some nice properties. For a fixed value of ρ, the probability
of business death decreases for increasing α. When α = 0, the restaurant
fails no matter the value of ρ because anyone who goes will leave a negative
rating. Similarly when α = 1, the restaurant cannot fail because anyone
who goes loves it. When ρ = 1, everyone knows what they want, so any
restaurant with α > 0 can survive. Contrast this case with ρ = 0.5, when
the private signal xi is essentially useless. In this case, only restaurants with
α > 0.5 can survive the rating system. More generally the worse individuals
are at knowing what they like, the more likely they are to go to a restaurant
they dislike, the more likely a restaurant is to be unlucky, receive the wrong
customers and die.
One feature of the plot which is hard to explain is the vertical discontinuities
at 23 and
3
4 . The more refined we make this plot, the more pronounced those
discontinuities become. The smooth transition between the regime where
every restaurant dies and every restaurant survives is perhaps the most
interesting feature of this graph. It is clear from this plot that if a restaurant
got to decide α or ρ, they should prefer α = 1, but if they have to have α < 1
they want ρ to be as large as possible. In other words however small α is, a
business can avoid death by making sure that the right customers and only
the right customers enter through the door. This effect can be sustained
by maintaining an average rating and relying on customers to follow very
accurate private signals.
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Recognizing that the majority of consumers are operating within this par-
adigm, the keen (say level k + 1) consumer would want an idea of how
accurate the rating is to the true quality. For this reason we plot the rating
bias, defined as the average rating minus the quality α.
Figure 3. Rating bias v¯1000 − α for various (ρ, α).
When α is very high or very low, the rating bias is nearly zero. This is
a consequence of the fact that when everybody likes the restaurant, it will
always get good ratings, and when nobody likes the restaurant, it will always
get bad ratings. More generally, the rating bias seems to depend more on ρ
than on α. When ρ is large (so that everyone knows what they want), the
lower quality restaurants get a high upward bias, i.e. their rating is higher
than their quality. To an outsider who does not know what they want, in a
world where everyone leaves reviews only for the places they like, the rating
system is useless. Towards the periphery of the semi-circle on the right
seems to be the ‘sweet spot’ where the rating system favors restaurants,
and conversely on the left semi-circle we have the rating system asserting
a highly negative bias. Around where α = 0.5 and ρ = 0.5 the downward
bias makes it so restaurants have ratings significantly lower than their actual
quality. Since business death is so prominent in this region of the plot, this
is what probably kills their ratings.
We wanted to come up with one more mechanism to mitigate these rating
biases, particularly the negative bias in moderate quality restaurants when
people have low ρ. So in Figure 4 we plot the rating bias when only half of
the population reads the reviews. The motivation for this is that business
death is cause by customers reading bad reviews. In contrast, no business
(at least for which α > 0) can totally die when some consumers only follow
their private signal.
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Figure 4. Rating bias v¯1000 − α for various (ρ, α), 12 readers
Introducing this sub-population sort of levelled out the bias in the average
rating. To be more precise, the bias is almost entirely eliminated in the
regime where ρ < 0.75. As hypothesized, the previously observed negative
bias was due to business death, which has become less likely. In the regime
where ρ > 0.75 the bias is still present, positive and large for small α.
Conclusions. Through mathematical analysis and simulations, on-line rat-
ings and their impact on businesses were characterized through two param-
eters: the inherent and objective restaurant quality factor, α, and the ac-
curacy of a customer’s gut feeling about a business, ρ. In particular, it was
shown that on-line ratings were seldom accurate mainly because of the low
or high accuracy in customers’ gut feelings.
When customers are very uncertain with regards to their preferences, they
tend to purchase products or services that they do not like and leave bad
reviews. If they so happen to be one of the first customers to rate the
business, the bad review is a condemnation to death. On the other hand,
accurate gut feelings tend to advantage medium-quality businesses through
self-selection. In general, no matter how bad a business or product is, it will
still be appreciated by a fraction of the population. By relying on accurate
gut feelings, customers who decide to purchase the low-quality product will
most often end up enjoying it and positively rating it.
Given that this effect is more pronounced for low quality businesses, it is
very likely the case that on-line referral systems help low-quality businesses
survive. Furthermore, if only a fraction of consumers read on-line reviews,
the business death risk is reduced for low-quality businesses and on-line
ratings further shift the scales in favor of low-quality businesses.
CASCADES & RATING GAMES 11
Acknowledgements. We’d like to thank our professor for his suggestions
throughout this project, for always staying after class to chat about game
theory and life, and for inspiring us to seed our random number generator
with ‘JIM,’ which yielded an altogether different picture of business death.
12 OUSSAMA FADIL, JAKE SOLOFF
Relevant Code.
function[rate, death] = rating(a, p, N)
%% Given alpha-rho values a,p and a number of customers N,
%% Returns the rating after N customers have opportunity to buy
% Assume first person follows private signal
rate = 0.5;
t = 1;
r = 0;%number of ratings so far
% User never goes when alpha smaller than 1-rho
while (rate > 1-p) && (t <= N)
%User likes the restaurant with prob. alpha
v = rand < a;
%Message is correct with probability rho
x = rand < (p*v + (1-p)*(1-v));
% User always goes if alpha greater than rho
% or x = 1 and alpha greater than 1 - rho
if (rate > p) || x
rate = (r*rate + v) / (r + 1);
r = r + 1;
end
t = t+1;
end
% indicates whether business died before
% the first N customers decided
death = (t < N);
end
%% Script to generate business death plots
alpha = 0:.01:1; I = length(alpha);
rho = 0.500001:.01:1; J = length(rho);
S = 10^3; N = 10^3; M = zeros(I,J);
for i=1:I
for j=1:J
p = rho(j); a = alpha(i);
B = zeros(1,N);
for n=1:N
[~,B(n)] = rating(a, p, S);
end
M(i,j) = sum(B)/N;
end
end
imagesc(flipud(M));
